Abstract. We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance G = (V, E) with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching problem in a roommates instance has been an open problem for several years and we prove its NP-hardness here. A sub-class of max-size popular matchings called dominant matchings has been wellstudied in bipartite graphs. We show that the dominant matching problem in G = (V, E) is also NP-hard and this is the case even when G admits a stable matching.
Introduction
We consider a matching problem in a graph G = (V, E) (need not be complete) where each vertex u ∈ V ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. Such a graph G is usually referred to as a roommates instance. A matching M is stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to M , i.e., there is no pair (a, b) such that both a and b prefer each other to their respective assignments in M .
Stable matchings always exist when G is bipartite [6] , however there are simple roommates instances that do not admit any stable matching. The problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists or not in G is the stable roommates problem. There are several polynomial time algorithms [12, 19, 21] to solve the stable roommates problem. Here we consider a notion called popularity that is more relaxed than stability.
Popular Matchings
The notion of popularity was introduced by Gärdenfors [7] in 1975. We say a vertex u prefers matching M to matching M if either (i) u is matched in M and unmatched in M or (ii) u is matched in both M, M and u prefers M (u) to M (u). For any two matchings M and M , let φ(M, M ) be the number of vertices that prefer M to M . Thus there is no matching M that would defeat a popular matching M in an election between M and M , where each vertex casts a vote for the matching that it prefers. Since there is no matching where more vertices are better-off than in a popular matching, a popular matching can be regarded a "globally stable matching".
It is easy to show that every stable matching is popular [7] . Since popularity is a relaxation of stability, popular matchings may exist in roommates instances that admit no stable matchings (see the instance on 4 vertices d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , d 3 on the left of Fig. 1 ). Here we are interested in the complexity of the popular roommates problem, i.e., the problem of deciding if G = (V, E) admits a popular matching or not. This has been an open problem for almost a decade [2] and we show the following result here.
Popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, since stable matchings always exist here. Popular matchings have been well-studied in bipartite graphs, in particular, a subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant matchings is well-understood [5, 9, 14] . Definition 2. A popular matching M is dominant in G if M is more popular than any larger matching in G, i.e., ∆(M, M ) > 0 for any matching M such that |M | > |M |.
Dominant matchings always exist in a bipartite instance and such a matching can be computed in linear time [14] . We consider the dominant matching problem in a roommates instance and show the following result.
Theorem 2. Given a roommates instance G = (V, E) with strict preference lists, the problem of deciding if G admits a dominant matching or not is NP-hard. Moreover, this hardness holds even when G admits a stable matching.
Background and Related work
The first polynomial time algorithm for the stable roommates problem was by Irving [12] in 1985. A characterization of roommates instances that admit stable matchings was given in [20] and new polynomial time algorithms for the stable roommates problem were given in [19, 21] . As mentioned earlier, Gärdenfors [7] introduced the notion of popularity in the stable matching problem in bipartite instances.
Algorithmic questions for popular matchings were initially studied in the one-sided preference lists model: here only one side of the bipartite instance has preferences over its neighbors. Popular matchings need not always exist in this model and there is an efficient algorithm [1] to determine if a given instance admits one. Popular mixed matchings always exist here [13] and such a mixed matching can be computed in polynomial time via linear programming.
In the stable matching problem in bipartite instances (the two-sided preference lists model), popular matchings always exist and a max-size popular matching can be computed efficiently [9, 14] . These algorithms always compute dominant matchings -it was shown in [5] that dominant matchings are essentially stable matchings in a larger bipartite graph. When ties are allowed in preference lists, the problem of deciding if a popular matching problem exists or not is NP-hard [2, 4] .
It was shown in [11] that the problem of computing a max-weight popular matching in a roommates instance with edge weights is NP-hard. This was strengthened in [16] to show that the problem of computing a max-size popular matching in a roommates instance is NP-hard. An efficient algorithm was also given in [16] to compute a strongly dominant matching in a roommates instance. Strongly dominant matchings are a subclass of dominant matchings; interestingly, in bipartite instances, dominant and strongly dominant are equivalent notions [14] .
It was shown in [10] that every roommates instance G = (V, E) admits a matching whose unpopularity factor is O(log |V |) and it is NP-hard to compute a least unpopularity matching in G. The complexity of the popular roommates problem was stated as an open problem in several papers/books [2, 3, 10, 11, 17] .
Techniques. We use properties of popular matchings in bipartite instances here -in particular, we use the LP framework of popular matchings that was initiated in [13] . Every popular matching M in a bipartite instance H is a max-weight perfect matching in a related graphH and an optimal solution to the dual LP (dual to the max-weight perfect matching LP) is a witness to the popularity of M . It is known that a matching in H is popular if and only if it has a witness α ∈ {0, ±1} n , where n is the number of vertices.
A stable matching in our roommates instance G will correspond to a matching in H with 0 as a witness and a strongly dominant matching in G will correspond to a matching in H with a witness α such that α u ∈ {±1} for all matched vertices u. We show a reduction from 1-in-3 SAT to the popular roommates problem via the problem of deciding if a desired popular matching exists in the bipartite instance H; such a matching is constrained to have a certain witness in {0, ±1} n which will prove its hardness.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 contains an overview of the LP framework of popular matchings in bipartite instances. Section 3 outlines the reduction from 1-in-3 SAT to the popular roommates problem and Section 4 has more details of our hardness reduction. Section 5 shows NP-hardness for dominant matchings.
Preliminaries
This section is an overview of the LP framework of popular matchings in bipartite graphs from [13] along with some results from [15, 16] . Let H = (A ∪ B, E H ) be a bipartite instance with strict preference lists and letH be the graph H augmented with self-loops, i.e., it is assumed that every vertex is its own last choice. Let M be any matching in H. Corresponding to M , there is a perfect matchingM inH defined as follows:
We now define an edge weight function wt M inH. For any vertex u and neighbors v, v inH, let vote u (v, v ) be 1 if u prefers v to v , it is -1 if u prefers v to v, else it is 0 (i.e., v = v ). The function wt M is defined as follows:
Thus wt M (u, v) ∈ {0, ±2}. We need to define wt M on self-loops as well: for any u ∈ V , let
It is easy to see that for any matching N in H, ∆(N, M ) = wt M (Ñ ). Thus M is popular if and only if every perfect matching inH has weight at most 0. Let n = |A ∪ B|.
Theorem 3 ([13]). Let M be any matching in H = (A ∪ B, E H ). The matching M is popular if and only if there exists a vector α ∈ R
n such that u∈A∪B α u = 0 and
The vector α will be an optimal solution to the LP that is dual to the max-weight perfect matching LP inH (with edge weight function wt M ). For any popular matching M , a vector α as given in Theorem 3 will be called a witness to M . The following lemma will be useful to us.
Lemma 1 ([15]
). Any popular matching in H = (A ∪ B, E H ) has a witness in {0, ±1}
n .
Call any e ∈ E H a popular edge if there is some popular matching in H that contains e. Let M be a popular matching in H and let α ∈ {0, ±1} n be a witness of M .
The popular subgraph F H is a useful subgraph of H defined in [16] .
The graph F H need not be connected. Let C 1 , . . . , C h be the various components in F H .
Lemma 3 ([16]
). For any connected component C i in F H , either α u = 0 for all vertices u ∈ C i or α u ∈ {±1} for all vertices u ∈ C i . Moreover, if C i contains one or more unstable vertices, either all these unstable vertices are matched in M or none of them is matched in M .
The following definition marks the state of each connected component C i in F H as "stable" or "dominant" in α -this classification will be useful to us in our hardness reduction.
Hardness of the popular roommates problem
Our reduction will be from 1-in-3 SAT. Recall that 1-in-3 SAT is the set of 3CNF formulas with no negated variables such that there is a satisfying assignment that makes exactly one variable true in each clause. Given an input formula φ, to determine if φ is 1-in-3 satisfiable or not is NP-hard [18] .
We will now build a roommates instance G = (V, E). The vertex set V will consist of vertices in 4 levels: levels 0, 1, 2, and 3 along with 5 other Fig. 1 ) described below. The vertex d 0 will be the last choice neighbor of vertex v for every v ∈ V \ {z}.
Vertices in V \ {d 0 , d 1 , d 2 , d 3 , z} are partitioned into gadgets that appear in some level i, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Every edge (u, v) in G where u, v are in V \ {d 0 , z} is either inside a gadget or between 2 gadgets in consecutive levels. We describe these gadgets below.
Level 1 vertices. Every gadget in level 1 is a variable gadget. Corresponding to each variable X i , we will have the gadget on the right of Fig. 1 . The preference lists of the 4 vertices in the gadget corresponding to X i are as follows:
The vertices in the gadget corresponding to X i are also adjacent to vertices in the "clause gadgets" corresponding to X i : these neighbors belong to the "· · · " part of the preference lists. Note that the order among the vertices in the "· · · " part in the above preference lists does not matter. Also, d 0 is the last choice of each of the above vertices. The preferences of vertices in D are given below.
The vertex d 0 will be adjacent to all vertices in G other than z. The order of other neighbors in d 0 's preference list does not matter. Let c = X i ∨ X j ∨ X k be a clause in φ. We will describe the gadgets that correspond to c.
Level 0 vertices. There will be three level 0 gadgets, each on 4 vertices, corresponding to clause c. See Fig. 2 . We describe below the preference lists of the 4 vertices a 1  1  00  00  11  11  00  00  11  11   00  00  00  11  11  11  00  00  00  11  11  11  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  1  1  00  00  00  11  11  11  00  00  00  11  11  11 00 00 00 11 11 11 00 00 00 11 11 11 0 0 1 1 00 00 11 11 0 0 1 1 00 00 11 11 Level 2 vertices. There will be three level 2 gadgets, each on 6 vertices, corresponding to clause c. The preference lists of the vertices p c t , q c t for 0 ≤ t ≤ 2 are described below. Also, d 0 is the last choice of each of these vertices. For the sake of readability, we have again dropped the superscript c from these vertices.
Let us note the preference lists of p 2 and q 2 : they are each other's fourth choices. The vertex p 2 regards q 0 as its top choice, y j as its second choice, and q 1 as its third choice. The vertex q 2 regards p 1 as its top choice, x k as its second choice, and p 0 as its third choice.
The preferences of vertices in the other 2 gadgets in level 2 corresponding to c (p The preference lists of the 8 vertices in the level 3 gadget corresponding to clause c are described above. For the sake of readability, we have again dropped the superscript c from these vertices.
It is important to note the preference lists of s 0 and t 0 here. Among neighbors in this gadget, s 0 's order is t 1 t 2 t 3 while t 0 's order is s 3 s 2 s 1 . Also, s 0 's order is interleaved with q 0 q 3 (these are vertices from level 2 gadgets) and t 0 's order is interleaved with p 7 p 4 .
There is one more vertex in G. This is the vertex z, the neighbors of z are ∪ i {x i , y i } ∪ c {a 
· · ·
Here n 0 is the number of variables in φ. Note that z prefers any neighbor in a level 1 gadget to other neighbors.
Thus the vertex set V is {z} ∪ {d
For any popular matching M in G, the following properties hold: Since the total number of vertices in G is odd, at least 1 vertex has to be left unmatched in any matching in G. Lemma 4 implies that the vertex z will be left unmatched in M .
Let G 0 be the subgraph of G induced on X ∪ Y ∪ {z}. The matching M restricted to G 0 has to be popular on G 0 , otherwise it would contradict the popularity of M in G. We will now show the following converse of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. If G 0 admits a popular matching that matches all vertices in X ∪ Y then G admits a popular matching.
Proof. Let M 0 be a popular matching in G 0 that matches all vertices in X ∪ Y . We claim
Let G 0 be the subgraph obtained by removing all negative 2 edges to M 0 from G 0 . Since M 0 is popular in G 0 , it satisfies the following three necessary and sufficient conditions for popularity (from [9] ) in G 0 .
1. There is no alternating cycle that contains a blocking edge. 2. There is no alternating path with z as an endpoint that contains a blocking edge. 3. There is no alternating path that contains two blocking edges.
We need to show that M obeys the above 3 conditions in the subgraph G obtained by deleting negative edges to M from G. The graph G is the graph G 0 along with some edges within the gadget D
It is easy to check that the edge set
3 )} satisfies the above 3 conditions in the subgraph of D obtained by pruning negative edges to M . We know that M 0 satisfies the above 3 conditions in G 0 . Thus M satisfies the above 3 conditions in G . Hence M is popular in G.
We will show the following theorem in Section 4. 
Proof of Theorem 4
Our goal now is to use the LP framework for bipartite matchings from Section 2. However the graph G 0 is non-bipartite. This is due to the presence of the vertex z. So let us convert the graph G 0 on vertex set X ∪ Y ∪ {z} into a bipartite instance H by splitting the vertex z into 2 vertices z and z . That is, every occurrence of z in the preference lists of vertices in Y will be replaced by z .
Thus H = (X ∪ Y , E H ) where X = X ∪ {z } and Y = Y ∪ {z}. The edge set E H of H is the same as the edge set of G 0 , except that each edge (z, v) where v ∈ Y gets replaced by the edge (z , v) in H.
The graph H is a bipartite graph with X ∪ {z } on the left and Y ∪ {z} on the right. The preference list of z (similarly, z ) is the original preference list of z restricted to neighbors in X (resp., Y ). The vertices of H \ {z, z } are level i vertices in G, for i = 0, . . . , 3. Let F H be the popular subgraph of H. It can similarly be shown for any edge e between a level 2 vertex and a level 3 vertex in H that e is not a popular edge.
Desired popular matchings in H
It is simple to see that M is a popular matching in G 0 that matches all vertices in X ∪ Y and leaves z unmatched if and only if M is a popular matching in H that matches all vertices in X ∪ Y and leaves z and z unmatched. We will call such a matching M in H a "desired popular matching" here. Let M be such a matching and let α ∈ {0, ±1} n be a witness of M , where n = |X ∪ Y |. The following two observations will be important for us. Recall Definition 4 from Section 2.
1. All level 3 gadgets have to be in dominant state in α. The following lemmas are easy to show and are crucial to our NP-hardness proof. Let c = X i ∨ X j ∨ X k be any clause in φ. In our proofs below, we are omitting the superscript c from vertex names for the sake of readability. Recall that α ∈ {0, ±1} n is a witness of our desired popular matching M .
Lemma 8. For every clause c in φ, at least two of the three level 2 gadgets corresponding to c have to be in dominant state in α.
Proof. Let c be any clause in φ. We know from observation 1 that the level 3 gadget corresponding to c is in dominant state in α. So α s0 = α t0 = −1. Also, one of the following three cases holds: (1) (s 0 , t 1 ) and (s 1 , t 0 ) are in M , (2) (s 0 , t 2 ) and (s 2 , t 0 ) are in M , (3) (s 0 , t 3 ) and (s 3 , t 0 ) are in M .
-In case (1), the vertex t 0 prefers p 4 and p 7 to its partner s 1 in M . Thus wt M (p 4 , t 0 ) = wt M (p 7 , t 0 ) = 0. Since α t0 = −1, we need to have α p4 = α p7 = 1 so that α p4 + α t0 ≥ wt M (p 4 , t 0 ) and α p7 + α t0 ≥ wt M (p 7 , t 0 ). Thus the middle and rightmost level 2 gadgets corresponding to c (see Fig. 3 ) have to be in dominant state in α. -In case (2), the vertex t 0 prefers p 7 to its partner s 2 in M and the vertex s 0 prefers q 0 to its partner t 2 in M . Thus α p7 = α q0 = 1 so that α p7 +α t0 ≥ wt M (p 7 , t 0 ) and α s0 +α q0 ≥ wt M (s 0 , q 0 ). Thus the leftmost and rightmost level 2 gadgets corresponding to c (see Fig. 3 ) have to be in dominant state in α. -In case (3), the vertex s 0 prefers q 0 and q 3 to its partner t 3 in M . Thus α q0 = α q3 = 1 so that α s0 + α q0 ≥ wt M (s 0 , q 0 ) and α s0 + α q3 ≥ wt M (s 0 , q 3 ). Thus the leftmost and middle level 2 gadgets corresponding to c (see Fig. 3 ) have to be in dominant state in α.
Lemma 9. For any clause c in φ, at least one of the level 1 gadgets corresponding to variables in c is in dominant state in α.
Proof. We showed in Lemma 8 that at least two of the three level 2 gadgets corresponding to c are in dominant state in α. Assume without loss of generality that these are the leftmost gadget and middle gadget (see Fig. 3 ).
In particular, we know from the proof of Lemma 8 that α q0 = α q3 = 1. This also forces α p1 = α p4 = 1. This is because α p1 and α p4 have to be non-negative since p 1 and p 4 are neighbors of the unmatched vertex z.
As q 0 and p 1 are the most preferred neighbors of p 2 and q 2 , we have wt M (p 2 , q 0 ) = wt M (p 1 , q 2 ) = 0. Since (p 2 , q 0 ) and (p 1 , q 2 ) are popular edges, it follows from Lemma 2 that α p2 = α q2 = −1. Thus either (i) (p 2 , q 0 ) and (p 0 , q 2 ) are in M or (ii) (p 2 , q 1 ) and (p 1 , q 2 ) are in M . This means that either wt M (p 2 , y j ) = 0 or wt M (x k , q 2 ) = 0. That is, either α yj = 1 or α x k = 1.
Similarly, wt M (p 5 , q 3 ) = wt M (p 4 , q 5 ) = 0 and we can conclude that α p5 = α q5 = −1. Thus either (i) (p 5 , q 3 ) and (p 3 , q 5 ) are in M or (ii) (p 5 , q 4 ) and (p 4 , q 5 ) are in M . This means that either wt M (p 5 , y k ) = 0 or wt M (x i , q 5 ) = 0. That is, either α y k = 1 or α xi = 1.
Thus either (i) the gadgets corresponding to variables X i and X j are in dominant state or (ii) the gadget corresponding to X k is in dominant state in α. Thus at least one of the level 1 gadgets corresponding to variables in c is in dominant state in α.
